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Abstract: 
Although there is greater acceptance that farmers can manage their irrigation systems 
efficiently, many irrigation experts believe that a shift from informal to more formal 
management strategies will lead to even better water-flow management. This article 
examines  a  case  in  Bali  where  attempts  to  introduce  formal  institutions  lead  to 
confusion within the farming community. We conclude that irrigation improvement 
projects need to engage with the local context and encourage a minimum of formal 
organization. 
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Introduction 
Irrigation systems in Southeast Asia have undergone significant changes in the last fifty 
years.(1) Technological interventions aiming at increased efficiency and crop 
productivity were accompanied by the implementation of centralized, government-led 
irrigation bodies, detaching local users from the management of their resources 
(Groenfeldt, 1997). Many state-operated irrigation infrastructures, however, deteriorated 
because social  aspects,  at  the centre for local  users,  were neglected in  the project 
designs (Meinzen-Dick, 1997). In consequence, the focus shifted to decentralization to 
include local water users in participatory management (Dayton-Johnson, 2003). 
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Nevertheless, there is still an underlying disposition that greater formalization of farmer 
managed irrigation systems (FMIS) will lead to even better water-flow management. 
Irrigation experts, non-government as well as government, find it difficult to grasp the 
'informality'   of   irrigation   management   which   is   part   of   local   resource   users' 
management strategies. 
 
Informality is the enemy of government improvement projects. Informality implies a 
shared understanding of the resource users, not only on how they manage the resource, 
but also how the resource is embedded in the local environment. Good knowledge of 
rainfall patterns, soil qualities, water dependencies, religious activities, and many more 
variables anchors the informality in such a complexity that it is extremely difficult and 
time   consuming   for   the   outsider   to   penetrate   into   this   complexity.   Irrigation 
improvement projects, therefore, tend to reduce the complexity to a few variables. What 
Scott (1998) calls the hegemony of scientific knowledge over local, practical knowledge 
allows   putting   the   complexity   of   local   practices   aside   by   labelling   them 
'underdeveloped'. This, then, is the determining attitude of developers in regard to 
simplifying local practices by emphasizing a few variables which they define as 
important. Such a simplification – often accompanied by introducing more formal 
institutions – can undermine the complexity which local users employ. It takes 
management variables out of the context and gives them a higher priority. For local 
users this complicates resource management rather than simplifying it because the 
context is disrupted. 
 
The Balinese subaks – loosely translated as socio-religious irrigation societies – are 
examples of how irrigation management is embedded into the social organization. 
Although subaks have formal arrangements concerning membership, territory, and 
members' rights and duties, these arrangements are embedded into social and ritual 
interactions between members and between adjacent subaks (Sutawan, 2000). Water 
distribution, the main concern of the subak, is negotiated on a daily basis between 
farmers, sub-subak heads, and subak heads. Social relationships, informal agreements, 
even disputes are seen as an integral part of the daily working of the subak as a whole. 
For Balinese farmers the subak is the framework in which the informal management can 
take place. External agencies tend to concentrate on the formal subak structure such as 
its law, internal hierarchy, and irrigation infrastructure, whereas subak members use 
both formal and informal subak institutions to optimize irrigation. The following 
paragraphs present a case study where irrigation improvement experts' perceptions 
collided with local users' attitude towards their irrigation system. 
 
One size does not fit all 
Major irrigation infrastructure improvements in Indonesia began in the early 1970s, 
almost at the same time as the introduction of high-yielding rice varieties. The 
development of new irrigation regions and the improvement of already existing ones 
aimed at increasing rice production to meet the needs of the fast-growing Indonesian 
population. The tremendous increase in irrigated regions in Indonesia brought with it 
immense operation and maintenance (O&M) costs for the government because the 
irrigation management was centralized in government offices. In 1989 the O&M costs 
amounted to 65 billion Rupiahs (US$ 37 million at that time) per year (Gerards, 1992: 
224). 
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The growing financial burden on the Indonesian government led to the introduction of 
irrigation service fees (ISF).(2) The objective of the ISF, to be paid by the irrigation 
water users, was to obtain full cost recovery for O&M cost of the main irrigation 
infrastructure for systems larger than 500 hectares (Bruns, 1992). However, such a 
decentralization of responsibilities and financial arrangements required localized 
irrigation management institutions not yet established in many parts of Indonesia. 
 
The government acted quickly and created water user associations (WUAs) to unite 
farmers who share a common irrigation infrastructure. Several pilot projects in West, 
Central and East Java as well as in South Sulawesi and North Sumatra were established 
in  the  years  1989-1991.  By  1992  the  government  had  transferred  more  than  four 
hundred irrigation systems to WUAs (FAO, 1993). It was seen as a big success, a win- 
win situation. On the one hand, the government could pass on O&M costs to the users 
and on the other hand, an institutional strengthening resulted by creating WUAs which 
worked closely with government officials in monitoring the irrigation infrastructure. As 
a consequence, the government extended the ISF to become a nationwide program. 
 
In Bali, the Bali Irrigation Project (BIP) financed by the Asian Development Bank, was 
launched  in  1979.  Irrigation  facilities  were  rehabilitated  or  expanded,  integrating 
smaller irrigation infrastructures into large systems sharing a common permanent weir. 
Here, there was no need for establishing WUAs. In the subak farmers were already 
cooperating in irrigation management. 
 
The pilot site selected for the ISF program in Bali happened to be the site where we did 
research in 2004-2005. These subak situated in the south central area of Bali were 
chosen because they are located close to urban centres, already share an irrigation 
infrastructure, and have an irrigation area of more than five hundred hectares. The 
government was interested in increasing the economic benefits by strengthening the 
subak because this region is renowned for producing the highest yields in Indonesia. 
After the selection of the pilot site, the 'socialization' phase of the ISF project began 
within the subaks. This meant informing the subak heads that they were chosen for the 
pilot project and explaining what the project was about. The subak heads were then 
asked to distribute the information amongst the farmers at the subak meetings. 
 
An important part of the project was the establishment and strengthening of 
infrastructural-management   institutions:   the   creation   of   a   regional   ISF   council 
consisting of government officials and subak representatives, and the administrative 
body.(3) The six subaks which were chosen for the pilot project were to establish a 
federation with the assistance from the government. This subak federation was to 
strengthen subak interaction and, as a result, optimize irrigation management. The ISF 
council was set up by the end of 1995. The subaks were combined into a federation by 
the end of 1996. Since the six subaks share a dam and a primary canal, no infrastructural 
adjustments had to be made. In the beginning the government was to play the role of the 
catalyst for the changes with the aim to eventually retreat to form an advisory and 
supervisory position (Bappeda, 1996). 
 
Three of the six subak heads still held their positions by the time we arrived in the field 
in September 2004. However, it took a while until we found out that they were actually 
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combined into a federation. None of the subak heads ever mentioned it to us. We 
learned about it two months later when we first met with the local government official 
involved in the project. During the interview he mentioned the subak federation to us. 
He explained that the subak federation was a corporate body which manages water, 
monitors the infrastructure, has three-monthly meetings and even has a written set of 
laws. In response we followed up on his information with interviewing the subak heads 
to find out more about the federation. We were expecting excuses as to why they didn't 
mention their federation- maybe there were conflicts with the government or amongst 
the subaks, and they didn't want to admit to such problems to Western researchers who 
came from so far to do research on subaks. None of this was the case. The subak heads 
were just apathetic and had difficulties putting into words what the subak federation was 
about. 
 
Over time, it became clear to us why the subak heads did not show any great interest in 
their federation. While the creation of WUAs and the introduction of ISF in Java, 
Sulawesi, and Sumatra had shaped a sense of belonging together amongst the farmers, 
for Balinese farmers this was already the case. On the other islands the farmers had been 
empowered to be responsible for their infrastructure rather than relying on the 
government. In Bali that was already part of the duty of every subak member towards 
their subak and it already embodied principles of equality and unity. 
 
Most of the elements which were to be strengthened by implementing the subak 
federation and the ISF had already been part of Balinese subaks as long as the farmers 
could remember. However, one major difference between the other islands and Bali 
seemed to emerge. Whilst the Javanese farmers saw the changes as acts of 
decentralization giving them more power, the subak heads and subak members in Bali 
saw the institutional strengthening as disempowering interference in their affairs. They 
weren't aggressively opposed to the government project; they were just not supporting 
it. Indeed, in 2004 the project was in limbo. Nobody really knew what was going on – 
and the subak heads did not seem to care. 
 
Basically, the creation of the subak federation was just putting a formal name on 
interactions which had already existed for a long time. This, somehow, did not make 
sense  to  the  subak  heads  -  especially the  creation  of  a  set  of  laws  for  the  subak 
federation to guide the subak heads in their interactions. Their interactions were 
embedded in the social texture of the local environment. The subak heads did not see 
any  benefit  in  formalizing  these  interactions.  However,  as  it  is  a  government 
requirement that a subak federation has a law book, they formulated some regulations 
by copying the law book from another subak federation – just changing the names of the 
subak. In 2005, they finally handed in the set of regulations in order to meet the 
government requirements. It took them nine years to do so. 
 
The problem with irrigation service fees 
In 1996, shortly after the subak federation was established the government went about 
trying to gather the new irrigation service fee from the subak members. The heads of 
subak were supposed to get their sub-subak heads to gather the money from the sub- 
subak members. But, the majority of the subak members were not willing to pay.(4) 
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A simple argument was brought forward by the farmers: 'Why should we pay an 
irrigation service fee if we are doing the irrigation servicing ourselves and anyway 
already pay several fees to the subak?'(5) All these fees, the farmers argue, are related to 
the maintenance of the subak – religious, infrastructural, or social. The subak members 
also maintain that they carry out O&M and would like to keep it that way because, if 
they do it, they know the O&M is of good quality. 
 
Although the subak heads expected problems from the government, nothing happened. 
The ISF was never enforced. One can only assume that the responsible government 
agencies understood the concerns of the subak members. While the WUAs never paid 
any fees for O&M up until the introduction of the ISF in other parts of Indonesia, the 
Balinese have always paid fees and been engaged in canal repairs in exchange for 
receiving their share of irrigation water. 
 
Operation and maintenance responsibilities – confusing simplifications 
Part of the national ISF project was to return O&M responsibilities to WUAs. The legal 
basis was provided by a national regulation of the Ministry of Home Affairs  (law 
6/1992). Just to remind the reader – the concept was that water users pay a service fee 
and the government provides infrastructural operation and maintenance services up to 
the tertiary infrastructure (Gerards, 1992: 227). Translated into a Balinese context this 
meant that the government was responsible not only for the dam, but also for the 
primary canal – which the subak members believe belongs to several subaks –, and the 
secondary canal – which lies within subak territory. Subak members see it as their 
responsibility  to  operate  and  maintain  these  canals.  Obviously  there  is  a  conflict 
between national law and the Balinese farmers' perception. This conflict continues to 
exist with the national government recently reinforcing the regulation. The new national 
water law 7/2004, article 41, for example, stipulates that the primary and secondary 
irrigation infrastructure falls under the responsibility of the provincial or regional 
government. The subak heads say it is quite confusing to know who is responsible for 
what, and as long as this confusion remains unsolved, the subak members will have to 
continue to do the O&M of the entire infrastructure just to make sure that everything is 
running to their full satisfaction. 
 
Usually,  the  regional  government  financially  supports  larger  canal  repairs.  If  the 
financial support is below one hundred million Rupiahs (US$ 11,000) the subak head 
can, if he wants, lead the maintenance work and involve the subak members if the 
assembly agrees on it. The subak is then responsible for all aspects of the repair work 
including the book-keeping, the purchase of building materials, the organization of 
labour requirements, and the reporting to the department of public works. The subak 
also carries full responsibility for the success of the repairs which is particularly related 
to the finances. If the repairs are done for less than the financial support received, the 
subak can keep the surplus, but if the costs exceed the given amount, the subak has to 
pay the excess out of its own pocket. 
 
If the maintenance work exceeds one hundred  million Rupiahs, the Department of 
Public Works directly tenders the project to a private business and the subak is not 
involved at all. Consequently, the subak heads try to keep the proposals below this 
amount because this allows them to be directly involved in the infrastructural repairs. It 
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again shows how centrally important the irrigation infrastructure is for subak internal 
organization. It represents the subak as a whole and binds adjacent subaks together. 
Naturally the infrastructure is the carrier of the most valuable resource in irrigated 
agriculture – water. As protective as the subak members are in keeping their autonomy 
in O&M, they are similarly concerned with water flow management. 
 
In summary, we suggest that the national plans to improve irrigation infrastructures by 
introducing irrigation service fees, creating WUAs, and introducing new national 
regulations to support all of these measures, have resulted in chaos. The heads of subak 
ask why things have to be made so complicated when, in the end, they operate and 
maintain their infrastructure like they have always done. Moves to simplify irrigation 
management by the government have had quite the opposite effect leading to a rather 
confusing situation amongst local users. 
 
Conclusion 
Government agencies entertain the view that to improve irrigation management, there 
should be a unilateral move from informal to formal institutional settings. Informal 
institutions are seen as weak links. They believe that to strengthen irrigation 
management,  there  would  have  to  be  an  emphasis  on  the  formal  arrangements  in 
decision making, focusing on representation, regularization and formalization. This 
implies that informal institutions should be gradually replaced by 'modern' arrangements 
in order to reduce the deficiencies of the 'traditional' (Seabright, 1993). 
 
Underlying these approaches are functionalist assumptions that better institutions can be 
crafted by policy-makers. Government officials praise the subak for its existing 
structures, such as clear boundaries of the irrigation area, obligatory membership for 
those who cultivate rice within these boundaries, and clear rules and regulations which 
subak members have to adhere to.(6) However, they complain that Balinese farmers are 
strong-headed, which leads to non-compliant behaviour and regular conflicts which in 
turn negatively affect optimal irrigation management. They lament that authority 
structures are unclear in a subak and that decision making lacks formal regulations. 
 
Yet, for Balinese farmers the authority structures are not ambiguous although they 
might  lack  formal  construction.  Every  subak  member  has  the  authority  to  make 
decisions regarding his own rice terraces, respecting of course the jointly agreed 
arrangements on the sub-subak and the subak level. The sub-subak heads have the 
formal authority to represent the sub-subak members at subak level and the informal 
authority to negotiate water with each other. The subak heads have the formal authority 
to represent their subak at inter-subak meetings and in inter-subak activities. This can be 
for ceremonies or in dealings with government officials. Informally the subak heads 
have the authority to negotiate water amongst each other in a beneficial way for the 
subak members. In these dealings they are expected to act in the best interest of the 
subak members they represent. 
 
Government officials also tend to perceive the subak as hierarchically organized. The 
subak head is perceived to be at the top. He has his sub-subak heads who enforce his 
decisions on the sub-subak level, and the subak members obey these orders. In reality, 
however,  authority  is  diversified  and  most  power  lies  on  the  terrace  level.  Such 
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decentralization is perceived to be impractical if the government wants to have control 
over irrigation management by using a bureaucratic approach. It seems impossible to 
situate a government official somewhere in the subak management system without 
disturbing already existing management arrangements. The subak members are too 
intertwined with subak matters and their irrigation management is not just a practical 
matter that can be easily modified, rather, it is embodied in complex relationships 
focussed on ideas of equality and unity. 
 
The conclusion which emerges from the discussion above is that government 
intervention will be far more efficient and effective if it encourages and enables a 
minimum of formal organization on the part of the farmers. The aim for subak 
development  should  be  to  avoid  unnecessary  and  expensive  institutional  overhead. 
Bruns (1992) argues that an active, successful WUA is one which efficiently and fairly 
distributes water and maintains and improves the physical infrastructure. The Balinese 
subak already accomplishes these elements – partly in formalized procedures, partly in 
informal interactions. It is questionable whether it is worthwhile to build up excess 
capacity to deal with contingencies. Government intervention should be selective and 
responsive rather than extensive and top-down. Reorganization is not beneficial unless 
it is based on local initiative and addresses specific local issues. As far as the Balinese 
subak is concerned, it would be wise to assume that current formal and informal subak 
institutions are adequate for effective irrigation management. 
 
Notes 
(1)  On  a  comprehensive  assessment  on  the  evolution  of  irrigation  in  South  and 
Southeast Asia, see Barker and Molle (2004). 
(2) The Indonesian word for the Irrigation Services Fee is  Iuran Pelayanan  Irigasi 
(IPAIR). 
(3) The ISF council was called BAMUS which is the abbreviation for Badan 
Musyawarah. The administrative body was called SETTAP which stands for Sekretariat 
Tetap IPAIR. 
(4) Subaks are sub-divided into smaller units. Each of these smaller units comprises an 
average of forty subak members who share a tertiary irrigation canal. The sub-subak 
head elected by members out of their ranks represents the sub-subak members at the 
subak level and can be consulted when there are conflicts. 
(5) The farmers pay a ritual fee to cover ritual costs; they pay a water fee which is used 
for infrastructural repairs calculated on how much water their fields receive; and they 
pay labour-substitute fees if they don't come along to communal labour activities. 
(6) While government officials regard subak laws as rigid and formal, subak members 
see them as 'behavioural' guidelines. Subak rules are seldom applied in a formal way. 
Rather, if a problem occurs which cannot be resolved at the terrace level, the head of 
subak can be asked for advice. He can consult the subak laws, but usually they are put 
into the particular context. Elder subak members are often asked for advice on how such 
matters were handled before. Decisions can only be made if the majority of the subak 
members agree with them. This, again, shows the unfamiliarity with practices where a 
single person such as the head of subak can make coercive decisions in a top-down 
matter. 
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